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Non Technical Summary 
The German dual apprenticeship system came under pressure in recent years 
because enterprises were not willing to offer a sufficient number of apprenticeship 
positions. A large theoretical literature argues that in Germany firms are willing to 
invest in apprenticeship training, i.e. to incur net costs during the apprenticeship 
period. On the basis of the specific institutional situation, firms have the 
opportunity to re-earn the net-costs after apprentices received their diploma and 
stayed in the firm. Important arguments are a high share of apprentices staying in 
firms, market power of firms and information asymmetries that allow firms to pay 
a wage below the productivity for “home-grown” skilled employees. It might be 
therefore argued that the gap on the apprenticeship market increased because the 
German firms are less willing to incur net apprenticeship costs (an indication for 
investment orientation) and instead increasingly try to cover the training costs 
already during the time before the apprentice got his or her diploma (an indication 
for productivity orientation).  
Until now there is no representative evidence on the investment versus 
productivity orientation of German firms when it comes to their decision to offer 
apprenticeships. So far only the net costs of specific training professions have 
been calculated on the basis of cross section interviews. Hereby training firms 
have been directly asked on their costs and benefits while non-training firms had 
to indicate their potential costs and benefits. This approach is more prone to 
measurement error than indirectly estimating costs and benefits on the basis of 
representative firm profit regressions. This paper, therefore, investigates for the 
first time if German enterprises on average indeed incur net costs during the 
apprenticeship period including data from firms with and without apprentices. 
This is done by calculating if the impact of (an increase in) the share of 
apprentices on contemporary net revenues minus wage costs is negative. A 
positive contemporaneous impact is interpreted as productivity orientation. If an 
increase in the share of apprentices decreases contemporaneous profits per head 
(and increases lagged profits per head), this is interpreted as investment 
orientation. 
The paper uses the representative linked employer-employee panel data of the IAB 
(LIAB) and takes into account possible endogeneity of training intensity and 
unobserved heterogeneity in the profit estimation by employing panel system 
GMM methods. An increase in the share of apprentices in the years 1997-2003 
had neither a contemporary nor a lagged effect on profits per head. This is 
interpreted as a first indication that indeed most establishments in Germany do not 
invest more in apprentices during the apprenticeship period than the apprentices´ 
productivity effect.  
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Abstract 
The German dual apprenticeship system came under pressure in recent years because 
enterprises were not willing to offer a sufficient number of apprenticeship positions. A 
frequently made argument is that the gap could be closed if more firms would be willing 
to incur net costs during the training period. This paper investigates for the first time 
whether German enterprises on average indeed incur net costs during the apprenticeship 
period, i.e. if the impact of an increase in the share of apprentices on contemporary 
profits is negative. The paper uses the representative linked employer-employee panel 
data of the IAB (LIAB) and takes into account possible endogeneity of training intensity 
and unobserved heterogeneity in the profit estimation by employing panel system GMM 
methods. An increase in the share of apprentices has no effect on profits. This can be 
interpreted as a first indication that most establishments in Germany do not invest more 
in apprentices than their productivity effects during the apprenticeship period. 
                                                 
* I thank Friedrich Breyer, Wolfgang Franz, Nicole Gürtzgen, Jens Mohrenweiser, and Alexander 
Spermann for important comments, Stefan Listl for support in the literature survey and Diliana Stoimenova 
for able research assistance. I am also grateful to the Forschungsdatenzentrum in der Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit in Nuremberg – and here especially to Peter Jacobebbinghaus – for being helpful with accessing the 
LIAB data. This research has been funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG) and has been 
conducted in close co-operation with my colleagues from the DFG research group “Heterogene Arbeit: 
Positive und normative Aspekte der Qualifikationsstruktur”. 
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 I.  Introduction 
The German apprenticeship system is stuck in a deep crisis. Since 2002 the demand for 
apprenticeship positions permanently exceeded their supply (see figure 1). While Eastern 
Germany traditionally exhibits a backlog of such positions, their demand in Western 
Germany since 2003 has, for the first time in years, once again risen above the available 
number of apprenticeship jobs (see figures A1 and A2 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 1: Development of supply of and demand for apprenticeship positions in Germany 
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Source: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (2006), own illustration 
 
A frequent reaction to the apprenticeship gap is the complaint that the firms do not invest 
enough in training apprentices. In this regard, it is usually argued that the apprentices’ 
wages frequently lie above their productivity during their training period. This means, 
however, that companies have to retrieve the positive net investment costs after the 
graduation of the apprentice. This might be a problem especially if the shares of the 
apprentices who stay at their training firms are low or whether the labour market situation 
does not allow to pay a lower wage for skilled employees trained in-house (Smits und 
Zwick 2004; Wolter et al.. 2006). An important empirical question therefore is whether 
German firms do invest in apprentices during their training period, i.e. whether they have 
net costs that have to be recovered after the graduation of the apprentice. 
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A first indication that net investment costs during the apprenticeship period are 
indeed an important obstacle for an increase in apprenticeship training is that according 
to the IAB establishment panel 20041, the most important reasons for not conducting 
apprenticeship training were: „We cannot retain the apprentices after the end of their 
apprenticeship“ and „Self-conducted apprenticeship training is too laborious/expensive“. 
By contrast, reasons such as „We meet our requirements by hiring qualified staff“ or  
„We would like to offer apprenticeship training but no appropriate applicants are 
available“ were not mentioned as widely. This paper therefore tries to assess whether 
there are indeed net investment costs during the apprenticeship training – in other words, 
whether the impact of apprentice share on the contemporaneous profit of the firm before 
they graduate is negative. 
Beicht et al. (2004) calculate that there are net costs of apprenticeship training 
between 30 and 70% of the total training costs in Germany while Wolter et al. (2006) 
show that in the majority of Swiss firms with apprentice training, productivity is at least 
equal to apprentices’ wages. The potential apprenticeship training costs of firms that do 
not offer that kind of training are markedly higher than the feasible productivity gain by 
apprenticeship training. Accordingly, the non-training firms would have to accept higher 
losses during apprenticeship training if they were to carry out such training. These cross 
section approaches have the disadvantage that they include subjective estimations of 
costs and benefits that may be biased by measurement errors2 and by social desirability.  
In order to measure the impact of apprenticeship training on company 
performance, it is possible to compare the apprentices’ productivity and wages. In the 
literature usually the contributions of the different qualification groups to a company’s 
productivity and their shares to the wage costs are calculated separately. Hellerstein et al. 
(1999) and Galindo-Rueda and Haskel (2005) compare, for example, in non-linear panel 
regressions the marginal productivity of different employee types with their relative 
wages.3 A higher positive share on productivity than the share on relative wages by a 
certain qualification group is interpreted as rent extraction by the firm from this 
                                                 
1 This is a descriptive evaluation of item 84 of IAB Betriebspanel 2004, concerning firms that, in spite of 
being authorised to carry out apprenticeship training, do not offer apprenticeship positions. 
2 In both studies for example apprentices´ benefits are calculated from benefits indicated by the respondent 
separately for typical unskilled and skilled activities and the share of activities the apprentices usually work 
as a substitute for unskilled and skilled employees in the firm. 
3 Please note that these studies do neither include apprenticeship shares nor German data. 
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qualification group. A problem with this approach is, however, that the wage and 
productivity equation have to be equally specified and the results may be strongly 
influenced by the specification choice.  
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature on the impact of 
apprenticeship training to the profitability of enterprises. It presents – to my knowledge 
for the first time – evidence based on representative and objective establishment data and 
it estimates the contribution of the share of apprentices on establishment profit directly in 
a profit estimation. Here the negative impact of a bigger share of apprentices on 
aggregate productivity is compared with their reduction of the average wage sum. 
Moreover, it is possible with the help of panel estimation techniques to account for the 
endogeneity in the composition of the qualification structure in the profit function as well 
as the unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity of firms. Finally, a number of further 
determinants of profits can be introduced to the estimation.  
This paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the determinants of 
the demand for apprentices and their impact on profits. Subsequently, the estimation 
strategy of the paper is presented. The fourth and the fifth section describe the data and 
the estimation results. The last section interprets the findings and their implications.  
 
II. Literature and Theoretical Background 
When asked about the crucial motives for apprenticeship training in their own firms, 
company owners often point out the social responsibility, the positive effects on the 
company’s image, or the company’s tradition in apprentice training (Sadowski, 1980; 
Stalder 1999; Niederalt et al. 2001; Schweri et al. 2003). In contrast, empirical studies 
show that the concrete decision for apprenticeship efforts mainly depends on the 
company owner’s individual cost-benefit-calculation (Wolter et al. 2006).  
According to the so-called „Warehouse Model“ (Backes-Gellner 1992, 1995) the 
optimal number of  apprentices is derived from calculating the costs of in-house training 
and the costs of adoption of workers trained elsewhere. Thereby it is assumed that both 
the shortfall and the excessive number of own apprenticeship trainees lead to opportunity 
costs. The decision to provide apprenticeship training in the own firm critically depends 
on whether the firm’s owner expects the training costs to be covered during training by 
means of the apprentice’s own productivity (productivity orientation, Lindley, 1975; 
 5
Neubäumer, 1999) or after the training through remuneration being lower than the 
staying former graduate apprentice’s productivity (investment orientation).  
Empirical studies show that apprentices’ contributions to productivity during their 
apprenticeship period in most firms cover and even go beyond the costs of training 
(Wolter et al. 2006). This means that the productivity of the apprentice covers the 
apprentice’s wage, the trainer’s wage, the acquisition and preservation costs for material, 
instruments and infrastructural facilities as well as for other costs. 
Based on Becker’s theory of human capital (Becker, 1964), a number of models 
were established that motivate an investment orientation that allows net investment costs 
during the apprenticeship period. Ex post, the net investment costs for training can be 
profitable for the firm if the personnel trained in-house, whose productivity is higher than 
the wage, is employed in the training firm (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998,1999a,b; Booth 
and Zoega, 2004). A lower wage than their productivity for the skilled employees can be 
justified by a number of arguments that focus on labour market imperfections 
First of all, apprenticeship training may mainly be industry-specific or rather firm-
specific (Becker, 1964). This means that the apprentice has a much smaller productivity 
at other potential employers and this gives the training firm a favourable bargaining 
position (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Smits and Stromback, 2001). This argument is 
weak in the German context because most qualifications are rather standardised, 
objectively tested and easily transferable to other firms in the same sector (Zwick 2001; 
Stevens, 2004).  
A further argument for a profit contribution of own apprentices after the end of 
their traineeship is that apprentices prefer to stay in their home region (Niederalt et al., 
2001). Remunerations below the productivity level are therefore possible as long as they 
are not lower than elsewhere considering the opportunity costs for mobility (Harhoff and 
Kane, 1997; Euwals and Winkelmann, 2001).  
Also, asymmetric information with regard to the contents of training programmes 
can be considered as important for wage reductions. When external firms cannot 
precisely assess the specific training in a firm, there is an incentive to provide also 
general training contents. Hence, the result is a higher productivity of the own 
apprentices which is not compensated by an equivalent wage raise (Chang and Wang, 
1996; Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Smits and Stromback, 2001). The above described 
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mechanism seems to be not particularly relevant for Germany because of the high 
transparency of the training contents (Smits and Zwick, 2004; Niederalt et al., 2001). 
Asymmetric information on the specific apprentice’s skills is another argument. 
Apprenticeship training providers are aiming at retaining a highly productive apprentice 
in the own firm. Their information advantage over other firms is utilized by firing the less 
productive apprentices. External firms cannot assess the real potential of a newly-trained 
apprentice and are thus not willing to pay the full wage for these (Elbaum and Singh, 
1995; Franz and Soskice, 1995, Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). 
Altogether, there is neither theoretical nor empirical consensus with regard to the 
extent to which the demand for apprentices in Germany is influenced by the willingness 
of the firms to invest in apprentices (Schwerdt and Bender, 2003, Dustmann and 
Schönberg, 2004). It is therefore unclear whether firms pursue a productivity or an 
investment oriented apprenticeship training policy. The current paper examines for the 
first time for Germany whether the apprenticeship training intensity influences the 
contemporary and the future profit per capita. It hereby assesses whether the German 
firms on average incur net investment costs during the apprenticeship period or not. 
In a production-oriented firm, a higher share of apprentices increases profits. On 
the contrary, for investment-oriented firms a higher share of apprentices reduces 
contemporary profits. It can be positive in the long-run, however, to increase the share of 
apprentices whether it is possible to keep the apprentices in the firm and pay them a wage 
below their productivity. Correspondingly, the relation between the share of apprentices 
and contemporary profit is an indicator for an orientation towards production or towards 
investment.  
We also include the share of other employee groups, e.g. different qualification 
groups in the profit function. This can be motivated by labour market inflexibilities, i.e. 
in this case by dismissal protection. While the firms can directly affect their share of 
apprentices, especially shrinking firms may face an inefficient composition of staff 
because employees cannot be replaced and laid off at will (Berthold and Fehn, 1998). 
Another reason for inflexibilities and an inefficient composition of the workforce may be 
a lack of suitably skilled job applicants (Kölling, 2002). As a consequence, some firms 
might not be at their profit optimal employee mix and an increase of the share of a 
particular employee groups would boost profits. Further personnel characteristics that can 
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play a role with regard to profits is the share of foreign nationals (Zimmermann, 1998), as 
well as the average age and the average tenure (Lazear, 1981).  
Classical explanation factors for profits are the market size and the (international) 
competitiveness (Fletcher, 2001; Gale, 1972). These are taken account of by the share of 
exports (Abel and Blanchard, 1986). Another important factor may be investments. 
However, in contrast to the previously mentioned variables it is not clear whether high 
investments boost profits or whether high profits enhance the investment affinity. In 
addition, it is well-known that establishments with works councils may be more 
profitable or at least have a higher productivity (Addison et al., 2004; Zwick, 2004b). 
Finally, East German firms are notoriously less profitable than their West German 
counterparts.  
For the following estimation it is important to note that besides the differentiation 
in different sectors, industries and firm sizes, further potentially important factors cannot 
be observed. The quality of industrial relations or cyclic fluctuations in demand, for 
example, can also be determinants for the firm’s profits while this cannot be directly 
controlled in our regressions. 
 
III. Empirical Specifications 
In this paper the impact of the share of apprentices on profits is examined. Besides the 
qualification structure of employees, further relevant determinants of the firm’s profits 
are taken account of. The profit function that is to be estimated is specified as follows:  
 
´ ´ , (1)it it í i itx uπ α β γ δ ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + +   
 
where t is a time indicator, i is an establishment indicator, πit is the profit per capita, and x 
is a vector of time variant explanatory variables. The vector u represents (practically) 
time invariant explanatory variables. Finally, δ denotes the unobservable time invariant 
factors and ε stands for the normally distributed error term with expectance value of zero.  
As a first step the profit functions of the firm are pooled, i.e. they are estimated as 
a cross section regression including observations from different years. That increases the 
number of observations, it also means that a firm that appears in several years is seen as a 
separate observation unit each time, however. Moreover, an estimation bias can occur in 
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that specification because of the unobserved firm heterogeneity, i.e. most firms have 
unobserved characteristics that influence both the firm’s profits and the share of 
apprentices. Examples are the quality of industrial relations or the innovation pressure 
that a firm faces. Here, the influence of a large share of apprentices on profits is upward 
biased whether good industrial relations lead to higher profits on the one hand and to 
higher training endeavours on the other hand. A further source of estimation bias is the 
possible endogeneity of the share of apprentices and other explanatory variables. It is 
possible that firms alter their qualification structure simultaneously with profits or that 
both are influenced by exogeneous shocks such as a positive trend in demand. It is 
conceivable, for example, that higher profits are a consequence of good personnel 
management and this also goes along with relatively high apprenticeship training efforts. 
In contrast, a relatively low profit might be a signal for a structural labour costs problem 
the establishment might try to solve by substituting skilled workers by apprentices..  
Time invariant unobserved heterogeneity can be avoided by estimating the model 
in first differences or, in other words, by explaining the change in profits from one year to 
the next by means of a change in the composition of employer qualification and other 
covariates. As a second step, the profit functions are therefore estimated as a so-called 
Fixed Effects Regression, i.e. in first differences:  
 
´ (2).it it itxπ β εΔ = ⋅Δ +   
 
Endogeneity of the explanatory variables can be removed by an instrumental variable 
regression. It is convenient, in this respect, to use GMM estimations with internal 
instruments, i.e. other moments of the same variable (Zwick, 2004a; Hempell, 2006). 
More precisely, the first differences of the explanatory variables are instrumented here by 
the levels of the lagged variables. We have to use lags t-2 if the variables are potentially 
endogeneous and lags t-1 if they are predetermined. We argued above that investments 
might be predetermined, i.e. profits in the last period have an impact on contemporary 
investments while we assume that all other time variant covariates are potentially 
endogeneous. The prediction power of the internal instruments could be small, however, 
given the only minor changes in the qualification structure of the employees from one 
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year to another, for example. That could evoke biases in the GMM Estimator in first 
differences (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
Therefore we prefer the so-called System GMM Estimator of Arellano and Bover 
(1995). Here, the differences are instrumented again with lagged levels as internal 
instruments. Simultaneously the levels of the covariates are instrumented by adequate 
lagged differences. The main advantage of this approach is that besides the temporary 
differences, also differences among firms in levels are taken account of in the estimation. 
That improves the information used in identifying the effect and usually enhances the 
precision of the estimator. A necessary condition for the System GMM Estimator is that 
the correlations between the unobserved fixed effects and the covariates remain constant 
over time (Arellano and Bover, 1995). The profit estimations are carried out with the help 
of a two-step method under the application of Windmeijer’s adjustment process for 
variances (Windmeijer, 2005), using the command xtabond2 in STATA 9.2 
(Roodman, 2005). 
 
IV. Data 
The data originate from the Linked Employer Employee Dataset of the IAB (LIAB), 
waves 1997-2004. The LIAB combines the employment statistics of the Federal 
Employment Agency (IABS) with establishment data from the IAB establishment panel. 
The employee statistics are taken from the German Employee Register 
(Beschäftigtenregister) which contains information on more than 98 percent of the 
employees in the firms from the IAB establishment panel (Alda, 2005). The advantage of 
this data set lies in the fact that no resorting to the subjective estimation of the respondent 
in the IAB establishment panel is needed and therefore measurement error is minimised. 
The IAB establishment panel is an annual survey of between 9,000 (in the year 1997) and 
16,000 (in the year 2004) companies.4 Some questions are posed retrospectively and 
therefore our panel spans the period 1997-2003. 
 The profit variable is calculated by subtracting the expenditures for inputs and the 
wage sum from the turnover (all divided by the number of employees) and by 
subsequently taking the logs.5 Because of the lack of a variable concerning capital and 
                                                 
4 For further information about the IAB panel see Kölling (2000). 
5 Profit per capita and investment per capita are added with a constant to make sure that all values are 
positive and hence can be logarithmised. The wage sum stems from the individual wage information in the 
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capital costs in the panel, no capital costs can be considered in calculating profits. All 
variables are divided by the number of employees. This means that profits per head are 
explained by the apprentice share. This should reduce potential biases stemming from a 
positive correlation between investments and profits. 
 The profit per capita in a firm is explained by the shares of employees with 
certain qualifications. We distinguish between the groups „in apprenticeship training“, 
“secondary school qualification without professional degree“, “secondary school 
qualification with professional degree”, “tertiary school qualification without 
professional degree, “tertiary school qualification with professional degree“, “degree 
from a university of applied sciences”, and a “degree from a university”. Here we take 
into account full-time employees only because a similar classification of qualifications is 
not available for part-time employees. We also include further employee characteristics 
such as the average tenure and age, the share of foreigners, females and parttime 
employees. Two indicators for industrial relations are also included: the presence of 
works councils and collective bargaining. Finally, it can be assumed that investments per 
employee and export share are correlated with profits. 
The variable “in apprenticeship training“ also includes volunteers, interns, 
apprentices in full-time schools (e.g. in the healthcare sector), as well as participants in 
vocational training and initial training. Therefore, interns and volunteers with still not 
established career are excluded from the information on “performed activity“. 
Furthermore, an alternative variable from social assistance notification (DEÜV Meldung) 
is generated, that explicitly excludes interns, working students, and short-term 
employees. In both variables the shares of apprentices are with around 8% of the work 
force slightly higher than in comparable data sets, partly because they include apprentices 
in full-time schools and employees participating in vocational training. As a robustness 
check also the information on the share of apprentices from the IAB establishment panel 
are used. All three indicators for the share of apprentices lead to practically the same 
results and therefore only the results on the basis of the social assistance notification are 
presented (compare table 1). 
                                                                                                                                                 
employment register. It is censored at the social security insurance level. For the censored wage 
regressions, we use an imputation procedure analogously to that in Addison et al., 2006. 
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V. Findings 
The pooled profit estimation in table 2 shows that the share of apprentices is significantly 
negatively correlated with profits. In addition, higher investments per capita, the presence 
of works councils, collective bargaining, and the export share are positively correlated 
with profits. The share of employees with a lower than tertiary qualification has a 
negative correlation, while the share of employees with a higher qualification is 
positively correlated with profits. The share of foreigners and parttime employees is 
positively correlated with profits while the share of female employees is negatively 
correlated.  
The pooled regression is possibly biased because observations of the same firm in 
different years are considered as independent and unobserved heterogeneity cannot be 
taken into account. The Fixed Effects Regression in table 3 shows, correspondingly, a 
smaller number of significant coefficients. Higher investments per capita and a higher 
share of parttime employees still correlate positively with higher profits per capita. The 
share of apprentices is now insignificant while still lower qualified employees have a 
negative and higher qualified employees have a positive correlation with profits. Average 
tenure is now negatively correlated with profits. Please note that we had to exclude all 
time invariant variables in the fixed effects estimation.  
The endogeneity problem is tackled in the system GMM regressions. Here, the 
lagged endogenous variable is added and instrumented. Investment per capita is regarded 
as a potentially predetermined variable, the dummies for industry, time, and firm size are 
assumed to be exogenous. The remaining variables are potentially endogenous. The 
lagged endogenous variable has a significantly positive impact on profit per capita 
(compare table 4). Both, the lagged share of apprentices and the contemporary share of 
apprentices have a positive albeit insignificant impact on profits. These results of our 
preferred estimation specification comply with results from Switzerland that a majority of 
firms is not ready to bear net costs during the apprenticeship training (Wolter et al., 
2006). They are in contrast, however, to German studies based on direct costs and 
benefits surveys that indicate that in all apprenticeship professions firms incur net costs 
during the apprenticeship training period (compare von Bardeleben et al., 1995; Beicht et 
al., 2004). While the contemporary shares of secondary education without and with 
professional degree and the share of a university degree have a negative impact on 
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profits, their lagged values are positive. According to our theoretical hypotheses the 
contemporaneous share of investments has a positive impact on profits per capita. The 
share of parttime employees as well as the share of foreigners has a positive impact on 
profits. The presence of works councils has a positive, the location in East Germany a 
negative impact on profits. The estimation diagnostics indicate that our preferred 
estimation specification is acceptable: The Hansen-Test does not indicate 
overidentification while the Arellano-Bond test does not indicate AR(2).  
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper examines for the first time the impact of apprenticeship training intensity on 
firms’ profits in the same and in the next year for Germany. The data basis is the 
representative linked employer-employee panel data set of the IAB (LIAB). This has the 
advantage that crucial variables such as the wage sum, the qualification shares and the 
share of apprentices in an establishment stem from administrative data and they are 
therefore measured with a comparatively low measurement error.  
The main question this paper tries to answer is whether German establishments 
accept net costs during the training period or whether they try to recuperate these costs 
with the apprentice´s productivity already during the training period (i.e. they are 
productivity oriented). The motivation for this exercise is the notion that if German 
establishments would invest more in apprenticeship training, the current gap in 
apprenticeship offers could probably be reduced. Our preferred estimation version shows 
that on average an increase in the share of apprentices has no impact on establishment 
profits in the same year and a year later. We might interpret this as an indication that the 
majority of German firms does not pay more for the apprentices than their productivity 
during the apprenticeship period. This finding is similar to results from Switzerland.  
In order to identify which firms pay more than the productivity during the 
apprenticeship training and which professions lead to net costs or returns during the 
apprenticeship period there are several natural extensions to the present approach. On the 
one hand differences in the profit impact of training intensities for several groups of 
establishments (for example those with and without works councils, establishments in a 
certain sector, size bracket, region etc.) should be analysed. On the other hand the share 
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of different professions that have different net costs during apprenticeships (compare 
Schweri et al., 2003 or Beicht et al., 2004) should be taken into account. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Variables Number of 
observations 
Averages 
Profit per employee in € (log) 27007 11.95 
Number of employees 47476 183.04 
Investment per employee in € (log) 31048 6.87 
Share apprentices 47640 0.08 
Share employees with secondary education, without 
professional degree 
47640 0.15 
Share employees with secondary education, with 
professional degree 
47640 0.62 
Share employees with tertiary education, without 
professional degree 
47640 0.01 
Share employees with tertiary education, with professional 
degree 
47640 0.03 
Polytechnics degree 47640 0.03 
University degree 47640 0.05 
Average tenure in days 47637 1946.41 
Average age 47640 38.81 
Share exports 32314 7.82 
Share females 47640 0.36 
Share foreigners 47640 0.05 
Share parttime employees 47640 0.13 
Collective bargaining 47640 0.75 
Works council 47265 0.41 
East Germany 47640 0.42 
Source: LIAB, waves 1997 – 2004, own calculations. 
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Table 2: Pooled Regression, dependent variable: profit per employee 
Variable Coefficient Standard deviation 
Investment per employee 0.017*** 0.001 
Share apprentices -0.194*** 0.025 
Works council 0.091*** 0.005 
Share employees with secondary 
education, without professional 
degree 
-0.084*** 0.014 
Share employees with secondary 
education, with professional degree 
-0.045*** 0.009 
Share employees with tertiary 
education, with professional degree 
0.380*** 0.047 
Polytechnics degree 0. 262*** 0.036 
University degree 0.117*** 0.029 
Average tenure 0.002 0.001 
Average age 0.015 0.019 
Share exports 0.050*** 0.005 
Share foreigners 0.083*** 0.022 
Collective bargaining 0.041*** 0.004 
Share females -0.038*** 0.009 
Share parttime employees 0.288*** 0.019 
Constant 11,699*** 0.069 
Number of observations 22,590 
0.1267 
210.92 (0,00) 
Adjusted R2 
F (15, 22590) (Probability F>0) 
Source: LIAB, Waves 1997 – 2004, own calculations. 
Notes: Significance levels: * < 0,1; ** < 0,05; *** < 0,01, reference value for qualification shares: tertiary 
education without professional degree. 
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Table 3: Fixed effects regression, dependent variable: profits per employee 
Variables Coefficients Standard deviation 
Investment per employee 0.003*** 0.001 
Share apprentices -0.0005 0.039 
Share employees with secondary 
education, without professional 
degree 
-0.031 0.035 
Share employees with secondary 
education, with professional degree 
-0.041* 0.024 
Share employees with tertiary 
education, with professional degree 
0.133* 0.057 
Polytechnics degree -0.009 0.060 
University degree 0.110* 0.059 
Average tenure -0.001* 0.0004 
Average age 0.011 0.032 
Share exports -0.006 0.007 
Share foreigners 0.044 0.050 
Share females 0.007 0.021 
Share parttime employees 0.494*** 0.020 
Constant 11.805*** 0.121 
Number of observations (firms) 22,757(9,130) 
54.08 (0.00) F(13,13614) (Probability F>0) 
Source: LIAB, Waves 1997 – 2004, own calculations. 
Notes: Significance levels: * < 0,1; ** < 0,05; *** < 0,01, reference value for qualification shares: tertiary 
education without professional degree. 
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Table 4: Two-step dynamic panel system GMM regression, dep. var.: profits per employee 
Variables Coeff. Standard deviation 
Profits per employee   
L1 0.272*** 0.048 
Investments per employee 0.003** 0.001 
L1 0.000 0.001 
Share apprentices 0.085 0.197 
L1 0.121 0.137 
Share secondary education without professional degree -0.410** 0.179 
L1 0.278* 0.154 
Share secondary education with professional degree -0.235** 0.103 
L1 0.226** 0.088 
Share tertiary education with professional degree -0.060 0.273 
L1 0.243 0.266 
Share polytechnics degree 0.082 0.300 
L1 0.017 0.196 
Share university degree -0.633* 0.330 
L1 0.779*** 0.285 
Average tenure 0.059 0.043 
L1 -0.038 0.033 
Average age -0.210 0.192 
L1 0.218 0.134 
Share exports 0.017 0.046 
L1 0.012 0.020 
Share foreigners 0.372** 0.170 
L1 -0.162 0.157 
Share females 0.095 0.098 
L1 -0.056 0.060 
Share parttime employees 0.202* 0.111 
L1 -0.138** 0.055 
Works council  0.053*** 0.012 
Collective bargaining 0.008 0.006 
East Germany  -0.072*** 0.019 
Constant 8.541*** 0.837 
Number observations (establishments) 12,264 (5,152) 
36.24 (0.00) F(53, 5151) (Probability F>0) 
Hansen Test on overidentification (Probability > χ2) χ2(259) = 252.96 (0.594) 
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1) in first differences (Pr > z) z = -7.87 (0.00) 
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2) in first differences (Pr > z) z = 1.23 (0.217) 
Source: LIAB, Waves 1997 – 2004, own calculations. 
Comments: Significance levels: * < 0,1; ** < 0,05; *** < 0,01. L1 means lag by 1 year, reference value for 
qualification shares: tertiary education without professional degree, additional variables: year dummies, 16 
sector dummies, 3 establishment size dummies. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1 Supply of and demand for apprenticeship positions in West Germany 
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Figure A2 Supply of and demand for apprenticeship positions in East Germany 
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